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Brown: Liability For the Torts of Independent Contractors in West Virgin

LIABILITY FOR THE TORTS OF INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS IN WEST VIRGINIA
LONDO H. BROWN*

T

HERE are many instances where a court has started out
with a general rule which answered its purpose in relation to
the particular set of facts and circumstances to which that rule was
applied but was found to be too broad when a slightly different
set of facts was subsequently presented to the court. The court was
then confronted with the problem of applying the rule and reaching an unjust result or creating an exception to the rule, and the
latter procedure has generally been followed. This course has been
so generally followed in fact that a rule without exception is the
exception rather than the rule.
In several instances there have been so many exceptions to a
rule established that, as a practical matter, the original rule is in
reality the exception and the exceptions now make up the rule.
A good example of this is found in the case of the well-known
hearsay rule which laid down the broad principle of law that hearsay evidence is not admissible. That rule was established many
years ago and perhaps was suitable in the particular case in which
it was applied. But today we find that such evidence is admissible
if it is a dying declaration,1 an admission against interest 2, a spontaneous exclamation and in many more instances. 3 In fact hearsay
evidence is admissible in so many instances today that the rule
would perhaps be easier to state and certainly easier to apply if it
were stated conversely; that is, that hearsay evidence is admissible
except in certain situations. The exceptions have so nearly eaten
up the rule that what is left of it is merely an exception to what
should be the rule.
Another example of the same idea is the rule that a tenant is
estopped to deny his landlord's title. This broad rule was found to
be unsatisfactory in cases where the landlord had conveyed the
title, subsequent to the lease, to the tenant,4 or to a third person,"
or in cases where the landlord was attempting to do more than

*

Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.

1

5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1430 (3d ed. 1940).
5 id. § 1455.

J 5 id. § 1426.
4 Wade v. South Penn Oil Co., 45 W. Va. 380, 32 S.E. 169 (1898); 1 TFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 134 (3d ed. 1939).

S 1 id. § 134.
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regain possession 6, or collect rent7, and so many exceptions to the
rule were created to prevent manifest injustice in these cases. The
rule might now be better stated in the converse, that is, that the
tenant is not estopped to deny his landlord's title except in cases
where the landlord has not changed his position in reference to the
leased premises since the lease was executed and the landlord is
not trying to do more than regain possession or collect rent.
Other similar examples could be cited but the above will
suffice since they are meant merely to serve as an introduction to the
primary subject of this article. But such introduction would be
incomplete without examples of rules which have been completely
swallowed by exceptions. It will be seen that in the above examples
the rules, though riddled by exceptions, are still in existence in
their mutilated state. Presumably in cases where the exceptions
have kept eating up the rules until nothing was left of them, the
rules are gone and nothing but the exceptions, or the converse of
the original rules, are left.
This is apparently just what has happened in some cases. One
example of this is the case of the asserted general rule that a manufacturer or supplier of goods is never liable for negligence to a
remote vendee or other person with whom he has no contractual
relations. Almost as soon as that rule was laid down the requirements of justice in particular cases impelled the courts to make exceptions to it and find some ways to get around the lack of privity
between the parties. After several exceptions to the rule were
made by the courts the leading case of MacPhersonv. Buick Motor
Co." practically abrogated the rule. In the words of Judge Lummus,
"The MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted
general rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule
could operate. Wherever that case is accepted, that rule in truth
is abolished, and ceases to be a part of the law." So it appears that
in a majority of jurisdictions 0 the rule now is that a manufacturer
or supplier of goods can be liable for negligence to a remote vendee
or other person even though there is no privity of contract between

them.
In speaking of another asserted general rule which had become
riddled with exceptions, Judge Cardozo stated:
6 Merchants & Farmers State Bank of Grove City v. Olson, 189 Minn. 528,
250 N.W. 360 (1933).
7Connolly v. Kilcourse, 285 Mass. 398, 189 N.E. 199 (1934).
8217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9 Carter. v. Yardley Co., 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E2d 693, 700 (1946).
10 Id. at 104, 64 N.E.2d at 700.
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"If there ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy existing,
not merely at the time of the decree, but at the time of the
formation of the contract, is a condition of equitable relief, it
has been so qualified with exceptions that, viewed as a precept
of general validity, it has ceased to be a rule today.""
Apparently this is what has happened, or almost happened, to
the independent contractor rule in West Virginia. In a sense this
rule is an exception to the basic rule of agency. That rule is that
the principal, or master, is liable to third persons for damages resulting from the conduct, or usually misconduct, of his agent, or
servant, who is acting within the scope of his employment or
authority. 12 This of course includes the torts of the agent or servant.' 3 Although this has been an established rule of law for over

250 years14 and is accepted as a matter of course, it is a rule which
should be made the subject of exceptions since it has the prima facie
unjust result of making one man pay for another man's wrong. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated that common sense is opposed to this unless
the one held legally liable actually brought the wrong to pass
according to the ordinary canons of legal responsibility.- In an
early West Virginia case the court stated:
"Ordinarily, no person other than the one immediately or
actually guilty of the wrongful act is liable therefor, except
upon the ground that the relation of principal and agent, or
master and servant, existed between the person or corporation
sought to be made liable and the person who did0 the act or was
guilty of the negligence that caused the injury."'
However, this rule, instead of being diminished by exceptions, has
grown to include more situations. One of the basic reasons for
the rule in the beginning, as well as for its growth, is apparently
that the damages are taken from a deep pocket and from one who
7
is in a position to spread the losses such liability causes.1
One of the broadest departures from this doctrine of respondeat
superior is the principle of law that one who employs an independent contractor' s to perform services for him is not liable for the
-1Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 493, 135 N.E. 861, 862 (1922).
MECHEM, OUTUNES oF AGENCY § .349 (4th ed. 1952).
"3Gregory v. Ohio River R.R., 37 W. Va. 606, 16 S.E. 819 (1893).
'4 See Jones v. Hart, K.B. 642 (1698).
'5 Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. ERv. 1, 14 (1891).
16 Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323, 335 (1880).
17 See Morris, Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 IL.. L. REv. 339 (1934).
is An independent contractor is a person exercising an independent employment with whom one contracts to do work according to the contractor's own
methods without his being subject to control in any important particular
except as to the result of his work. See Waldron v. Garland Pocahontas Coal
Co., 89 W. Va. 426, 109 S.E. 729 (1921).
12
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torts of the contractor in the performance of such servicei. 19 It
should be pointed out that this principle of law is generally considered a general rule itself rather than an exception to the above
general rule of agency inasmuch as the courts usually say that the
independent contractor is not an agent or servant due to the lack
of control by the employer. But it seems that it could be considered
as an exception to the agency rule because if it were swallowed by
exceptions the agency rule would spring up and take its place since
the doctrine of respondeat superior, meaning literally, "let the
principal answer",2 0 appears to be the most logical theory upon
which the liability of the employer for the acts of the independent
contractor can be predicated. The rule in such case would be that
the employer, or principal, would be liable for the acts of the one
acting for him even if that one should be an independent contractor,
and the reason behind the rule would be the same as one of the
reasons behind the aforementioned agency rule, that is, that he
2
who acts through another is himself the actor. 1
The rule exempting the employer from liability for the torts
of an independent contractor was established because, while the
independent contractor admittedly performs services for the one
who employs him, he is only subject to the control of his employer
in so far as the result desired is concerned and is not subject to his
control in so far as the manner of achieving that result is concerned.2 2 Apparently it was considered that it was going sufficiently
far to make one person pay for another person's wrong when that
other person was performing a service for him and was fully subject to his control. Our supreme court has stated that neither
reason nor justice requires that an employer should be held responsible for the manner of doing an act when he had no right or
2
power to direct or control that manner.
But in spite of the reason behind the rule the ever expanding
theory of respondeat superior began catching up with this rule
soon after it was first applied in most jurisdictions. As a result the
rule was very soon limited in its scope by exceptions.
In one of the earlier cases applying the rule in West Virginia,
1" Carrico v. West Virginia C. & P. Ry., 89 W. Va. 86, 19 S.E. 571 (1894);
Walton v. Cherokee Colliery Co., 70 IV. Va. 48, 78 S.E. 63 (1911).
20 See Alamo Downs v. Briggs, 106 S.W.2d 788, 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
21 See Cochran v. Michaels, 110 W. Va. 127, 157 S.E. 178 (1981).
22 See Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 828 (1880), and Anderson v.
Tug River C. & C. Co., 59 W. Va. 801, 53 S.E. 718 (1906), overruled on another
point in Dunbar Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crissey, 92 W. Va. 419, 114 S.E. 804 (1922),
and Gray v. N. & W. Ry., 99 W. Va. 575, 180 S.E. 189 (1925).
23 Anderson v, Tug River C. & C. Co., 59 W. Va. 301, 307, 53 S.E. 713, 715
(1906).
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it was recognized that the employer of an independent contractor
might be liable for the negligent conduct of such contractor if the
employer was negligent in the selection of the contractor. 4 To
further limit the scope of the rule it was also held that an employer
seeking to bring himself within the rule excusing him from liability
on the ground that the work was being done by an independent
contractor had the burden of proving the relationship of employer
25
and independent contractor.
As a matter of fact the rule was adopted with an exception in
West Virginia. In the earliest case applying the rule in this state,
the court said that the rule did not apply where the contract directly
requires the performance of work intrinsically dangerous however
skilfully performed. The court stated:
"In such case the party authorizing the work is justly regarded as the author of the mischief resulting from it,
whether
'20
he does the work himself or lets it out by contract.
But the court then made the exception far broader than the above
statement would indicate by holding that where work on streets was
let to an independent contractor which necessarily involved the
making of an obstruction or defect in the street of such nature as
to render it unsafe or dangerous for the purposes of public travel,
unless properly guarded or protected, the employer would be liable
to a person injured thereby. In that case the unsafe or dangerous
obstruction for which the employer was held liable, even though the
work was let to an independent contractor, was an excavation in the
street to put in a sewer.
Such a broad application of this exception, even at that early
date, might be said to have about eaten up the rule since almost
any work may well create an unsafe condition if proper precautions
are not taken. Nevertheless the court has continued to assert the
rule as being the law in West Virginia, but in many cases has found
a fitting exception to the rule so as to hold the employer liable.
This is consistent with the aforementioned trend in the field of
agency to enlarge the scope of the employer's liability. Thus, in
a later case, the employer was held liable where the work let to
a contractor was the grading of a railroad right-of-way on the

24 See Carrico v. West Virginia C. & P. Ry., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S.E. 571 (1894),
where the court limited the employer's nonliability to cases where he contracted

with a fit and proper person exercising an independent calling. See also
Anderson v. Tug River C. & C. Co., 59 W. Va. 301, 53 S.E. 718 (1906).
25 Kirkhart v. United Fuel Gas Co., 86 W. Va. 79, 102 S.E. 806 (1920).
26 Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323, 836 (1880).
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ground that the rule did not apply because the work was intrin27
sically dangerous.
Another exception to the rule, and one which is similar to
the preceding exception, is that in order for the rule to apply, the
work contracted to be done must not be of such a nature that it is
likely to become a nuisance,28 and still another exception is that
the work to be done must not be unlawful.29
A further exception to the rule, and one more comprehensive
than the last two mentioned, is that the doctrine of nonliability
of an employer because the act complained of was the act of an
independent contractor does not apply where the thing which the
contractor does, and does negligently, is something which the law,
in defense of public interest, requires the employer to do carefully
and properly. 0 This applies in situations where the employer
owes a duty to the public which cannot be delegated-a nondelegable duty. In addition to the cases falling under this exception are those where there is an absolute common law duty such as
the duty to give one's neighbor lateral support31
These exceptions took a big bite out of the rule but, taken by
themselves, they still leave the rule subject to exceptions in spite
of the broad interpretation given intrinsically dangerous activities
by the court. There are still left many situations where an employer has used due care in selecting an independent contractor to do
work which is not intrinsically dangerous, which is not unlawful
nor does not constitute a nuisance and where the law does not
impose a special duty. A common example is the hiring of a
competent contractor to haul one's products.

Walton v. Cherokee Colliery Co., 70 W. Va. 48, 73 S.E. 63 (1911).
Anderson v. Tug River C. & C. Co., 59 W. Va. 301, 53 S.E. 718 (1906).
29 Ibid.
3o See Carrico v. West Virginia C. & P. Ry., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S.E. 571 (1894),
where the court held that the duty of a railroad to keep its tracks clear so that
its cars can pass safely is non-assignable and the fact that an independent contractor was employed to do work on such tracks and negligently obstructed the
track is no defense if a passenger is injured thereby; and Vickers v. Kanawha
& W. Va. R.R., 64 W. Va. 474, 63 S.E. 367 (1908), where the court reached the
same result where an employee was injured because of contractor's negligent
performance of employer's non-assignable duty to provide employee with a safe
place to work.
31 See Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S.E. 1087 (1910), where the
court intimated that this duty would be non-assignable after stating, "A person
or corporation on whom positive duties are imposed by law cannot avoid
liabilities for injuries resulting from failure to perorm such duties, by employ27
28

ing a contractor for the purpose;

. . ."

(But the court relied upon the fact that

the contractor was under the control of the employer as to manner of accomplishing the result, as well as to the result, for its holding in the case.)
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But the exceptions cut much deeper and the cited example
might conceivably fit into another exception which appears broader
than any yet mentioned.
Perhaps the majority of modern cases holding the employer
responsible for the acts of an independent contractor are based
on the exception that where the damage results directly from thc
acts of the contractor which the employer expressly authorizes or
which are necessary to perform the contract, the employer is
liable. This exception was adopted in West Virginia at a very
early date in the case of Walton v. Cherokee Colliery Co., where
the court stated the rule in the syllabus in this language:
"Generally, if one let work, lawful within itself, to a contractor
and retain no control over the manner of its performance, he
is not liable on account of negligence of the contractor or his
servants. But if the work is intrinsically dangerous, or is of
such character that injury to third persons, or their property,
might reasonably be expected to result directly from its performance, if reasonable care should be omitted, the employer is
not relieved from liability by delegating 2the performance of
the work to an independent contractor.".
And in the body of the opinion the court quoted with approval
the following excerpt from the syllabus of an Ohio case: 38
"One who causes work to be done is not liable, ordinarily, for
injuries that result from carelessness in its performance by the
employes of an independent contractor to whom he has let
the work, without reserving to himself any control over the
execution of it. But this principle has no application where a
resulting injury, instead of being collateral and flowing from
the negligent act of the employe alone, is one that might have
been anticipated as a dixect or probable consequence of the performance of the work contracted for, if reasonable care is
omitted in the course of its performance."
Under a strict application of this exception the employer in
the example cited above could be held liable for the negligence
of the independent contractor or his employees resulting from the
hauling of the employer's products since injury to third persons
or their property might reasonably be expected to result directly
from the performance of the work if reasonable care should be
omitted. Indeed there are few human activities where injury to
others might not be anticipated if reasonable care is omitted in
the course of the performance of the activity. In fact, it might
be said that there would be few situations where the defense of
independent contractor would be of benefit to an employer if
70 W. Va. 48, 73 S.E. 63 (1911).
33 Railroad Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 N.E. 269 (1890).
32
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damage to a third person resulted from the performance of the
work contemplated by the contract if this exception were strictly
applied. But before such a conclusion can be reached, it is necessary to ascertain if possible just what the court means when it
speaks of "resulting directly".
In the Walton case 4 the court said that if the work contracted
necessitated blasting which would in reasonable contemplation
subject adjacent buildings to risk of danger the employer could not
escape liability by employing a contractor to do the work. This
apparently because damage resulting to those buildings by such
blasting would be a direct result of the work contracted to be done.
That type of work would also fit into the inherently dangerous
activity exception, but other cases show that the "direct result"
exception is not limited to activities covered by the other exceptions.
In the case of Walker v. Strosnider, where the work let to the contractor was excavating to build a new building which took away
the lateral support of an adjacent landowner, the court stated:
"If the injury results directly from the acts called for or rendered necessary by the contract, and not from acts which are
merely collateral to the contract, the employer is liable as if
he himself performed such acts." 35
However, the court in that case did not rely upon any exception to
the independent contractor rule for its holding since it found that
the contractor was following the orders and specifications of the
employer and therefore the employer had control of the manner of
accomplishing the result as well as the result and there was no
employer-independent contractor relationship. 36 But the court has
twice since cited the case as authority for this exception to the
independent contractor rule.
In Sun Sand Co. v. County Court,3 7 the court, citing the Walker
case as authority, held that if the damages be such as would
naturally flow from the work let to be done, and may have been
reasonably expected as a consequence if the work be done in accordance with the plans and specifications, the employer cannot
escape liability therefor because he has let the work to an in8
dependent contractor; and in Law v. Phillipsy
a recent case in
which the facts were almost identical to those in the Walker case,
the court, again citing that case as authority, used the exception
34

70 W. Va. at 51, 73 S.E. at 64.

35 67 W. Va. at 62, 67 S.E. at 1098.

36 Id. at 63, 67 S.E. at 1098.
ST 96 W. Va. 213, 122 S.E. 536 (1924).
38 68 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1952).
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as one of the grounds for its decision. In that case the court
used the following language:
"The employer of an independent contractor is liable if the
resulting injury to a structure on the land of an adjoining
owner is such as might have been anticipated as the probable
consequence of the negligent performance by the independent
contractor of the work directed to be done."' 89
Thus it would seem that an injury "results directly" from
the work contracted to be performed if it results from an act
called for by the contract or rendered necessary thereby. But
the court in all of the three last cited cases stated that the injury
resulting from the act of a contractor must be the direct result
of the work provided for in the contract as opposed to a collateral
result before the employer is liable. So it seems that to understand clearly what the court means by direct result, it is necessary
to understand what it means by collateral result.
Exactly what the court does mean when it speaks of a collateral result is not entirely clear since no case has been decided
upon that point,40 but the court has used language at various
times from which some idea may be garnered as to the meaning
they intend to give the phrase.
In the Wilson case the court stated:
"Where the obstruction or defect caused or erected in the
street is purely collateral to the work contracted to be done
and is entirely the result of the wrongful acts of the contractor
or his workmen, the rule is that the employer is not liable;
but where the obstruction or defect, which occasioned the injury results directly from the acts which the contractor agrees
and is authorized to do, the person, who employs the contractor and authorizes him to do these acts, is equally liable
4
to the injured party." '
In the Anderson case the court used this same language with
the further observation that "if one employs a contractor to do
an act which may be done in a lawful manner, and the contractor in doing it unnecessarily commits a nuisance, whereby
injury results to a third person, the employer will not be liable." 2
In the Sun Sand Co. case, the court stated:
".. . Or should the contractor, should he be an independent
contractor, deviate from the plans and specifications and do
some collateral act incidental to but not reasonably necessary
in the performance of the work, perhaps the county court
39

Id. at 460.

clearness is not limited to our own court.
LAW oF ToRTs 488-490 (1941).
41 19 W. Va. at 337.
4259 W. Va. at 311, 53 S.E. at 717.
40 This lack of
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would not be liable. The county court cannot absolve
itself from liability for damages which necessarily or reasonably flow from the construction of a road through the lands or
of another by simply letting the construction to conproperty 43
tractors.."

And in the Law case the court stated:
"Though an employer is not liable for the injury caused by
the negligence of an independent contractor or his servants
which is collateral to and not reasonably to be expected from
the work contracted for, such employer is liable for the negliof
gence of the independent contractor where, from the nature
the work, danger of such injury is readily foreseeable." 44
In one sense it might be said that the court, in determining
whether the result is direct or collateral to the work to be done,
has borrowed a test from the negligence field of tort law. The
test there generally used is that the actor is liable for results
reasonably foreseeable or to be anticipated.
But it is suggested that it might not be necessary to go outside the field of agency to find an applicable rule which would
give the same result. Since it appears that now the employer is
liable for the acts of an independent contractor if the employer
authorized those acts, expressly or impliedly, it seems that the
general rule that the employer is liable for the acts of his servant
or agent which are within the scope of his employment is
applicable here as well as in the usual master and servant, or
principal and agent, relationship. Under this rule where the
agent acts beyond the scope of his employment or, as some courts
put it is on a frolic of his own, the principal or employer is not
liable. 4 5 Analogous to the frolic situation is the unforeseeable
collateral act of the independent contractor for which the employer is not liable since it is not an act within the scope of the
enterprise. Since the employer's liability depends upon the normal
and foreseeable manner of performance of the work to be done,
there will be no liability on the part of the employer if the contractor voluntarily adopts some unusual or unexpected method
of performing the work such as uncontemplated or unnecessary
blasting. In such case the situation would be analogous to the
agency cases where the agent performed the work in an unauthorized and unexpected manner; for example, using a car
to do work authorized and expected to be done on foot. In
such cases it is generally recognized that the employer is not
43
44
45

96 W. Va. at 217, 122 S.E. at 538.
68 S.E.2d at 460.
See Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co., 118 W. Va. 545, 191 S.E. 558 (1937).
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liable for injuries occasioned by the unauthorized and unexpected
manner of performance." The theory behind this rule, like the
theory behind the rule that the employer is not liable for the collateral results in case of a contractor, is that it is unfair to hold
the employer for results which he could not reasonably foresee
and guard against. Nor would there be liability on the part of
an employer of an independent contractor if an injury was caused to
a third person by the act of the contractor in doing something
unrelated to the performance of the work. Here again there
would be no liability if the relationship of principal and agent
existed since it would be an act outside the scope of the agent's
employment or authority.
Therefore it seems possible to have one general rule where
one person is performing services for another rather than two
rules, one of which, with its exceptions, arrives at the same results
as the other. That rule could be that the employer is liable
for the acts of his agent, even though that agent be an independent contractor, if the agent is acting within the scope of his employment.
To determine what acts are within the scope of an agent's
employment so as to determine the extent of the employer's
liability, it is necessary to look to what the agent is employed, or
authorized, to do. If the act of the agent which caused the
injury to the third person was one which he was authorized
to do, it was within the scope of his employment and the employer is liable. It seems that the same test is now used to determine whether the employer of an independent contractor is
liable for the acts of the contractor. This is borne out by the
language of the court when it indicates that the employer is liable
if the contractor was directed or authorized to do the act which
resulted in the injury to the third person, or if that act was
called for or rendered necessary by the contract. 47 In such
case, in the language of the court in the Walker case, 48 ". . . the
employer is liable as if he himself performed such acts." This
is borrowing a phrase from the agency field where it is often
48 See Lambert v. Satsky Trucking Co., 118 N.J.L. 485, 193 Atl. 702 (1937)
Lwhere agent used own car to deliver goods supposed to be delivered in company
truck (probably insured) ]; Miller v. Western Union Tel. Co., 68 Ohio App. 1
25 N.E.2d 466 (1939) (where messenger boy hired as bicycle messenger, used
automobile); and St. Louis, I.M. 9- S. Ry. v. Robinson, 117 Ark. 37, 173 S.W.

822 (1915) (where boy sent to call employees unnecessarily and unauthorizedly

used a bicycle).
47 See quotations at notes 39, 35 and 26 supra, from Law v. Phillips, Walker
v. Strosnider, and Wilson v. City of Wheeling.
48 67 W. Va. at 62, 67 S.E. at 1098.
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stated that one who acts through another acts himself.
The main justification for the independent contractor rule
in the first place was that where one employs such a contractor,
he does not have sufficient control to justify his being held liable
for the acts of the contractor. It was said that since the employer
has control only as to the results to be attained and not as to the
manner or means of accomplishing these results, it would work
an injustice to hold the employer liable for the acts of the contractor in accomplishing such results. 49 But as a practical matter
in cases where the one performing services is not an independent
contractor, there are many cases where the employer's right of
control is of little avail since he is not often with the employee
to exercise that right, and the fact that the employee fails or
refuses to obey instructions as to manner of performance does
not absolve the employer of liability.50 The contention that it
is unjust to hold the employer liable when he has no control
as to the manner of performance is further met with the argument that when he expressly authorizes the reaching of a result,
he impliedly authorizes a reasonable manner of accomplishing that
result and it is only for acts within such reasonable manner of performance that he is held liable. This, too, is like the agency rule
that the employer is liable for the acts of the agent which are
within the scope of his implied authority.51 So in a case where
the court found that the employer impliedly authorized the act
of the contractor, the lack of his control over the contractor as
to manner of reaching the result desired did not bother the court. 2
When the reason for a rule disappears, the rule generally disappears and it seems that this reason for this rule has lost its force.
Whether or not it is unjust to hold the employer liable if
the party whose act caused the injury is an independent contractor,
the court is continually doing so. Further, the same thing has
often been said in regard to holding the principal liable for the
acts of his agent. 53 Admitting that it is prima facie unjust to
make one man pay for another man's wrong, much of the same
reasoning used to support the well-established agency rule can
be used to support a rule holding an employer liable for the acts
of an independent contractor who is performing services for him.
40 See note 23 supra.
50 Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S.E. 112 (1917).
6' Cochran v. Michaels, 110 W. Va. 127, 157 S.E. 173 (1931).
52 See quotation from Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. at 336.
53 See Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 14 (1891).
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These reasons were set out in considerable detail in Cochran v.
Michaels where the court, speaking of the agency rule, stated:
"Many different foundations for the rule have been suggested. A very common one among judges and writers is the
maxim, qui facit per alium facit per se. ('He who acts through
another acts by himself.') 1 Blackstone, Com. 429, 430; 18 R. C.
L., subject, Master and Servant, sec. 247; Wood, Master and
Servant, sec. 277. This maxim, however, as pointed out by
Pollock, 'states the effect of the rule, not any reason for it.' One
reason offered by this author is that whoever 'exposes others
to risk (per alium) should abide the consequences if the risk
ripens into actual harm.' Essays in Jurisprudence, p. 122. And
then again, 'I am answerable for the wrongs of my servant or
agent, not because he is authorized by me or personally represents me, but because he is about my affairs, and I am bound
to see that my affairs are conducted with due regard to the
safety of others.' Pollock, Torts, p. 81. The earlier decisions
attributed the rule to such principles as: 'Whenever one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has
enabled said third persons to occasion the loss must sustain it,'
(Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1787, 2 T. R. 70); and 'he who
expects to derive advantage from an act which is done by
another for him, must answer for any injury which a third
person may sustain from it,' (Hallv. Smith, 1824, 2 Bing. 145).
The first principle above was adopted by Bishop in sec. 608,
Non-Contract Law. The second principle seemed sufficient to
the present savant of our own Court, JUDGE LIVELY, in Wills
v. Gas Co., 104 W. Va. 12, 17. 'The rule is founded on the principles of justice between man and man,' declared Caldwell, J.,
in R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415, 432, (Lawrence). Many
other judges have taken this view. The law writers generally,
however, have based the rule entirely on consideration of
PUblic policy. 'The rule making the master liable does not
epend upon foundations of natural justice, but is defended
upon consideration of expediency.' "54
But in spite of all this, to say that the independent contractor rule has been repudiated in West Virginia at this time
would be to refuse to face facts. There are too many cases, one
a very recent case, where the employer was absolved of liability

54 110 W. Va. at 130-131, 157 S.E. at 174.
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on the ground that the negligent party was an independent contractor, to be ignored. 55
But most of these cases can possibly be distinguished on the
ground that they turned upon the issue of whether the one performing the services was an independent contractor and the court
did not consider the possibility of their fitting into any of the
exceptions to the independent contractor rule. Thus in the
Anderson case50 the work let to the contractor was cutting mine
props for the employer's mine and the court held that the employer was not liable because the one performing the service was
an independent contractor. But the plaintiff's injury was sustained when the contractor negligently (it was alleged) allowed one
of the props or logs to roll down a hill upon the plaintiff. There
the injury might well have been said to have resulted as a direct
consequence of the work directed to be done by the contract and
since the work was being done in the manner usual to such work
that the employer had impliedly authorized this manner of performing the work and therefore he was liable. This would seem
consistent with the above quoted language of the court in the
Law case,5 7 its latest expression on the subject, inasmuch as the
resulting injury was such as might have been anticipated as the
probable consequence of the negligent performance by the independent contractor of the work directed to be done.
The court in the Greaser case 5s had a substantially different
situation before it in that the one held to be the independent contractor was bringing action against the employer. Hence it is not
on all fours with other cases in this field where it is usually a
third party bringing action against the employer for injuries resuiting from the negligence of the independent contractor.
In the Rogers case- the employer had called a car laundry,
asked that his car be called for, serviced and returned to his
home. The plaintiff was injured while the car was being delivered
to the employer's home, something that might have been anticiir, Moore v. Burriss, 132 W. Va. 757, 54 S.E.2d 23 (1949) (driver and his
truck hired under contract to deliver newspapers); Rice v. Builders Materials
Co., 120 W. Va. 585, 2 S.E.2d 527 (1938) (truck and driver hired under contract);
Gunnoe v. West Virginia Poultry Coop. Ass'n, 115 W. Va. 87, 174 S.E. 691 (1934)
(truck route salesman); Oakley v. Thornbury, 114 W. Va. 188, 171 S.E. 426
(1933); Rogers v. Boyers, 114 W. Va. 107, 170 S.E. 905 (1933) (service station
delivering automobile to customer); Greaser v. Appaline Oil Co., 109 W. Va.
396, 155 S.E. 170 (1930) (gasoline distributor); Anderson v. Tug River C. & C.
Co., 59 W. Va. 301, 53 S.E. 713 (1906) (one contracting to supply mine timbers).
56 59 W. Va. 301, 53 S.E. 713 (1906).
57 68 S.E.2d 452 (IV. Va. 1952).
58 109 W. Va. 396, 155 S.E. 170 (1950).
60 114 W. Va. 107, 170 S.E. 905 (1933).
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pated as a probable consequence of the negligent performance
of the work directed to be done. But the court, without mention.
ing any exceptions to the rule, held that the employer was not
liable since the one performing the services was an independent
contractor. The same type situation was involved and the same
result reached in the Oakley case. 0
In Gunnoe v. West Virginia Poultry Co-op. Ass'n, Rice v.
v. Builders Materials Company and Moore v. Burriss,61 the employers were held not to be liable because the ones performing
services were independent contractors. The contractors were
owners of vehicles driven by themselves or their employees. The
plaintiff in each case sustained injuries due to alleged negligence
in the operation of the vehicles in the performance of the work
contracted to be done. While the court did not raise the question, it could again be said that these injuries were such as might
have been anticipated as the probable consequence of the negligent performance of the work directed or authorized to be done.
It might be that in any or all of these cases, with the exception of the Greaser case, the court might have held the employer
liable even though the one performing services was an independent
contractor, as it has in many cases, if counsel for the plaintiff had
attempted to establish liability on the part of the employer in
spite of such relationship by means of one of the exceptions to the
independent contractor rule.
However, this was attempted by counsel for plaintiff in a case
in which the opinion was handed down after this article was written, and immediately before it went to press, and the attempt was
unsuccessful. 62 In that case the plaintiff was injured through the
alleged negligence of a gasoline distributor and the court followed
the Greaser case in holding that a gasoline distributor was an
independent contractor. In answer to plaintiff's contention that
the employer was not relieved from liability for the reason that
the work engaged to be performed was intrinsically dangerous the
court quoted the syllabus from the Walton case 3 and stated that
the rule had no application to the instant case. In support of that
statement the court stated, in effect, that while the careless and
negligent handling of gasoline is inherently dangerous this is not
true if it is carefully handled. The court apparently took the
position, and correctly so it seems, that for the work to be intrin.
60 114 W. Va. 188, 171 S.E. 426 (1933).
61 Cases cited note 55 supra.
6 Brewer v. Appalachian Contractors, 76 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1953).
63 See quotation at note 32, supra.
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sically dangerous it should be dangerous however skillfully per64
formed.
After finding that the work was not intrinsically dangerous
within the meaning of that part of the rule quoted from the
Walton case the court did not mention the last part of that rule to
the effect that the employer of an independent contractor is not
relieved from liability if the work let to be done is of such character
that injury to third persons or their property might reasonably be
expected to result directly from its performance if reasonable care
should be omitted. It would appear that if any of the exceptions
to the independent contractor rule were applicable under the
circumstances this would be the logical one since it was alleged that
plaintiff's injuries resulted from the negligent handling of gasoline,
the work let to be done, by the one found to be an independent
contractor. But even if counsel for plaintiff had relied upon this
exception the court might have found it not to be applicable on the
ground that the result was not a direct result inasmuch as the
manner of performance which produced the result was not to be,
anticipated.5
But even though these cases may not be necessarily inconsistent with the theory that the court has virtually abandoned the
independent contractor rule, there remain situations where no
court is likely to hold an employer liable for the acts of an independent contractor even though that contractor might be acting
within the scope of the enterprise. For example, if one should
be injured by a piece of flying glass when a watch repairman
negligently drops a watch he is repairing and breaks the crystal,
should he be able to seek out the person who owns the watch
and left it with the repairman for repairs and hold him liable
simply because at the time of the injury the negligent party was
performing a service for him? Or should a person who hires a
taxi be held liable for the negligence of the driver during the
carriage simply because a service is being performed for him?
While it might be said that in such cases there is no employment
relationship at all, this would be simply a matter of degree.
The alternative to the discarding of the independent contractor
rule and applying the rules of agency to such cases is to turn to
the negligence field of tort law. The court could adhere to its
direct or collateral result rule and use the foreseeability test as it
has shown a distinct tendencyo do. In the Brewer case the court,
04 Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323, 836 (1880).
Or See quotation at note 66, infra.
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in holding that the employer of the independent contractor was not
liable, seemed to use the foreseeability test as a basis for the holding
without mentioning direct or collateral result when it stated:
"Surely American could not reasonably have anticipated that
Mayfield would pour such a quantity of gasoline into the
tank in the sand house of Christopher Coal Company as to
overflow and cause the explosion; and there is nothing in the
record to charge American with knowledge that Christopher
Coal Company had placed a coal stove in its sand house, which
stove was burning at the time of the explosion, and had
stored there quantities of dynamite, the latter of which was
the effective cause of the explosion resulting in plaintiff's
injuries."60
The court in cases prior to the Brewer case was apparently
thinking in terms of causation when it speaks of direct result.
Therefore it seems that if, from the nature of the work contracted
to be done, it can reasonably be foreseen that there is danger of
such result the employer is liable if such result actually occurs.
That is, if the performance of the work in the normal manner contemplated by the contract would involve an unreasonable risk of
such harm to third persons then such harm occurring in the performance of the work is a direct result of the work and the employer is liable. Or, stated in yet another way, where the particular risk is involved in the work to be done itself, then if the
result is within that risk, it is a direct result of the work to be
done and the employer is liable, otherwise it is a collateral result
and the employer is not liable.
The obvious difficulty with following this course is the confusion which would result. This confusion will be apparent to
those familiar with the subject of causation in tort law.
In conclusion it seems that whatever the court does in this
field in the future, it should at least recognize that if there is anything left of the independent contractor rule in West Virginia that
rule has at least been fundamentally modified.

a6 76

S.E.2d at 925.
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